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This paper explores the connection between the subsidiarity principle and 
national sovereignty in the context of EU environmental policy. In addition to 
providing an historical account of this connection, the paper suggests that 
subsidiarity represents a Janus-faced concept capable of either supporting or 
undermining the legitimacy of EU environmental policy. By developing 
explicit criteria by which to apply subsidiarity, a number of areas are identified 
in which existing EU authority could be replaced by exclusively national action 
or laws which granted states significantly more discretion over environmental 
decisionmaking. Examples are then presented where this shift of power back to 
the member states has already been proposed and in some cases already 
occurred, recasting the balance between national sovereignty and supranational 
environmental constraints. Throughout the analysis, particular attention is paid 
to the efforts of Britain, a primary antagonist in the debate, to preserve its 
sovereignty over environmental policy.






















































































































































































Political debate surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
highlighted the perennial difficulty within the European Community of dividing 
power between member states and supranational institutions.2 As has often 
been the case during times of significant change in the Community, actors with 
seemingly irreconcilable views avoided negotiating deadlock by agreeing upon 
language capable of bearing multiple meanings. Inclusion of the subsidiarity 
principle in the treaty simultaneously satisfied those who sought to limit or even 
reverse the accretion of power in Brussels, and those who favoured reinforcing 
Community authority.
While the subsidiarity principle will fuel opposing arguments in all areas 
where diverging visions of the Community's proper trajectory are held, 
environmental policy does not usually spring to mind as one such area. Indeed, 
many observers have suggested that pollution control lends itself so much to 
supranational action, that, by invoking the subsidiarity principle, 'in the area of 
the environment, it should be easy to substantiate the reasons for Community 
action.'3
In light of this prevailing attitude, this paper has two primary objectives: 
first, to examine how the subsidiarity principle represents a Janus-faced concept 
which can be deployed to legitimate EC intervention in the field of 
environmental regulation or to justify a return to greater national sovereignty;
o
second, to assess the extent to which the subsidiarity principle has already 
altered the development of EU environmental policy in a manner which shifts 
power back to the member states.
After a brief conceptual framework, the paper consists of four sections. 
The first explores the connection between subsidiarity and sovereignty in EC 
environmental policy before and after the Single European Act. The second
throughout this article the terms European Union (EU) and European Community (EC) 
will be used interchangably.
) ( .  3K. Lenaerts, 'The Principle o f Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: 



























































































section, which constitutes the bulk of the paper, examines events since 
subsidiarity was formally incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union. The explicit criteria put forward by the Council and Commission to 
apply subsidiarity is used to clarify the conditions under which each of the 
concept's two 'faces’ should determine the balance between EU authority and 
national sovereignty. Section three then considers the issue of democratic 
legitimacy as an important additional, but equally two-faced, criteria for 
applying the subsidiarity principle. Finally, a fourth section reviews the 
available empirical evidence. As perhaps the primary antagonist in this debate, 
the role of Britain occupies a central position throughout the analysis.
Conceptual Framework
Within the multi-level governance of the EU, the concepts of sovereignty 
and subsidiarity are intimately linked. Sovereignty relates to the relative 
autonomy of nation states to pursue their chosen policy goals free from outside 
interference. In practice, particularly in a world of interdependent states many 
of which choose to participate in a supranational regime, sovereignty is best 
conceptualised along a stylised continuum. At one end of this continuum state 
governments enjoy unfettered authority to make or repeal any law they choose, 
thereby pursuing the widest possible range of policy objectives within their own 
national borders. As one moves to the other end of the continuum, all power 
shifts from the state to the higher authority, in this case the EU. The state 
accepts policy goals, and the choice of instruments to pursue those goals, which 
are determined exogenously. It may be the case that the state encouraged this 
shift of power and eagerly accepts these externally generated policies. 
Alternatively, the state might oppose supranationalism but nevertheless be 
obliged to suffer the imposition of policies devised externally.
The concept of subsidiarity holds that decisions should be taken at the 




























































































level will be the lowest available.4 When operationalised for a federal or multi­
level system of governance such as the EU, subsidiarity provides a useful tool 
for moving along the continuum of state sovereignty. In its starkest sense, in 
each policy area subsidiarity allocates decisionmaking authority between the 
state and supranational level, thereby demarcating the legitimate boundary 
where state sovereignty ends and EU supranational competence begins.5 In 
some cases such clear demarcation is impossible. Therefore a less binary 
conception is called for, whereby the subsidiarity principle determines the 
appropriate level of national political discretion exercisable within certain 
general constraints established supranationally.
Environmental policy provides one of the clearest examples to date of the 
dynamic connection between subsidiarity and sovereignty. Environmental 
policy was not mentioned in the original treaty but the Community still gained 
power over this area. This expansion of Community action into a new policy 
field, while formally acknowledged and given legal justification in the Single 
European Act (SEA), was accompanied by inclusion of a subsidiarity principle, 
thereby forming a permanent link between the two concepts.
Subsidiarity Before and After the SEA
Although not explicitly described as subsidiarity, the concept of 
allocating authority amongst several levels of decisionmaking has always been
4The philosophical underpinnings of the subsidiarity principle are discussed in K. Van 
Kersbergen and B. Verbeek, 'The Politics o f Subsidiarity in the European Union,' Journal of 
Common Market Studies 32 (1994), 215-236.
5A growing literature explores the diffusion of power away from national governments, 
particularly towards sub-national actors. While the diffusion debate raises a number o f issues 
directly connected to subsidiarity and the appropriate decisionmaking level for environmental 
policy, due to space constraints this article focuses exclusively on the division o f power 
between states and the EU. For analysis o f the diffusion issue and the continuing role o f 
national governments, see G. Marks, L. Hooghe and K. Blank, 'European Integration and the 
State,' paper presented at APSA meeting, New York, 1-4 September, 1994, A. Moravcsik, 
'Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International 
Cooperation,' Harvard Centre for European Studies, Working Paper Series #52, 1994, J. 
Golub, 'State Power and Institutional Influence in European Integration: Lessons from the 





























































































present in EC environmental policy. The first Environmental Action 
Programme (EAP), adopted in 1973, recognised no less than five possible levels 
of action.
In each category of pollution, it is necessary to establish the level of 
action (local, regional, national, Community, international) best suited 
to the type of pollution and to the geographical zone to be protected. 
Actions likely to be most effective at Community level should be 
concentrated at that level; priorities should be determined with special 
care.6
It is noteworthy that in drawing distinctions, the first EAP nevertheless 
highlighted the Community level for concentrated action. The third EAP, 
adopted in 1983, removed this emphasis, inserting instead a slight presumption 
against centralised powers: "the Community level should be reserved for those 
measures which can be most effective there."7
A variety of factors suggest that Britain was primarily responsible for the 
inclusion of a subsidiarity concept in the EAPs. With its particularly strong 
attachment to national sovereignty and its unique approach to environmental 
protection, Britain has a long history of treating European integration and EC 
environmental policy with scepticism.8 Britain was not entirely happy with the 
idea of EC environmental policy, which, after all, was never mentioned in the 
original treaty.9 Nor were British industries pleased by the prospect of having 
to alter their traditional methods of pollution control, characterised by dispersal 
and absorption, in order to meet uniform emission standards proposed by the 
Commission and suited for the continent.
SOJ Cl 12 20.12.73.
7OJ C46 17.2.83.
8See J. Golub, British Integration into the EEC: A Case Study in European Environmental 
Policy (Oxford University doctoral thesis, 1994), W. Wallace, 'What price independence? 
Sovereignty and interdependence in British politics," International Affairs 62 (1986) 367- 
389, W. Wallace, ’Foreign policy and national identity in the United Kingdom,' International 
Affairs 67 (1991) 65-80, C. Lord, 'Sovereign or Confused? The "Great Debate" about British 
Entry to the European Community 20 Years On,' Journal o f Common Market Studies 30 
(1992)419-436.
9See House of Lords Select Committee on the EC, 'Approximation of Laws Under Article 
100 of the EEC Treaty,' 22nd Report, 1977-78, House of Lords Select Committee on the EC, 




























































































As part of this scepticism, the notion of 'selectivity' appeared in the 
Government's 1972 memorandum 'A Policy for the European Environment'.
selectivity, at the Community level effort should be concentrated on 
work most appropriately done at that level and there should be careful 
choice of priorities...When it comes to implementation...rather than 
pursue common legislative or administrative measures, the member 
states of the Communities should build severally on their existing and 
well-tried methods of working.10
The similarity between selectivity and the subsidiarity provisions contained in 
the EAPs is striking.
While there is little evidence to indicate that other states made use of the 
subsidiarity provision in the early stages of EC environmental policy, Britain 
saw subsidiarity as a mechanism to limit EC power. Subsidiarity was deployed 
in particular at key moments during the Commission Presidency of Roy Jenkins 
in order to maintain national control over 'grey areas' of policy which arguably 
could have been dealt with at Community level.11
The 1987 Single European Act incorporated specifically into the new 
environmental section of the treaty what would later become known and applied 
more generally as the subsidiarity principle. Article 130R(4) of the SEA held 
that 'The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the extent 
to which the objectives...can be attained better at Community level than at the 
level of the individual member states.'12
Inclusion of the subsidiarity principle must be seen within the larger 
political context surrounding the SEA. In general, the SEA was the product of 
an intergovernmental bargain between government elites in the large member 
states, although the shape and timing of this bargain was to some extent
10D. Evans, Britain in the EEC (London, Victor Gollancz, 1973), p.45.
11 See M. Wilke and H. Wallace, Subsidiarity: Approaches to Power-Sharing in the 
European Community (London. Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1990).
12Before entering the treaty, the subsidiarity principle appeared both in the 1984 Draft 
Treaty on European Union and in the Dooge Committee Report. In each o f these places it 
was accompanied by the same ambiguity-a recognition o f several levels o f authority but also 
a number o f justifications for Community action, particularly the size, scale and 




























































































influenced by the Commission and executives of transnational businesses.13 
The environmental provisions of the SEA constituted a delicate balance 
between states which favoured legitimating and possibly expanding EC 
environmental powers, and those seeking to place limits on the previously 
unbounded Community prerogative. As drafted, the subsidiarity provision 
reassured each of these camps—it could signal a presumption in favour of 
national action at the expense of EC power, or, in line with the first EAP, it 
could generate an implicit acknowledgement that most issues could be solved 
better at Community level, thereby setting the stage for a further centralisation 
of authority.
As most member states were comfortable with enhanced EC power in 
general, and power over environmental questions in particular, the real 
significance of including the subsidiarity provision in the SEA was its appeal to 
Britain, a country well known both for its practically unrivalled sensitivity on 
questions of national sovereignty and its unenviable position as the 'dirty man of 
Europe'.14
Although the Government's faith in the subsidiarity principle as a formal 
safeguard for British sovereignty and Britain's unique environmental policy 
style was much less apparent during negotiations over the SEA than in 
subsequent disputes over the Maastricht Treaty, the inclusion of the principle in 
Article 130R bears all the marks of British influence. Department of 
Environment (DOE) and British Permanent Representative (UKREP) officials 
recall that from the first mention of selectivity in its 1972 memo, right through 
the drafting of the SEA, the Government frequently invoked the subsidiarity
13See A. Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act, National Interests and 
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community,' International Organization 45 (1991) 
19-56, W. Sandholtz and J. Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain,' World Politics 
42(1989) 95-128.
14It is also certainly true, as Steiner suggests, that the German Lander were instrumental in 
putting subsidiarity on the EC agenda. See J. Steiner, 'Subsidiarity Under the Maastricht 





























































































concept against Community environmental proposals, although at issue were 
economic considerations and not matters of high principle.
The First Secretary of UKREP during negotiations of the SEA noted that 
the British, while never launching a broadside attack against the legitimacy of 
EC environmental policy, 'would from time to time say that [they] did not think 
that a particular piece of legislation needed to appear before the Council at all. 
This was sort of the first germs of the subsidiarity idea' (Interview, 15 Jan. 
1993). A former Head of the DOE Central Unit on Environmental Protection, 
who was also active during the period in which the SEA was negotiated, offered 
a similar view of British strategies, whereby the subsidiarity issue was 'really 
just being thrown in to object to something [we] did not like...not a matter of 
high principle but of low cash, basically' (Interview, 3 Dec. 1992).
For the British, subsidiarity represented a fairly small but important 
aspect of a larger intergovernmental bargain which produced the environmental 
provisions in the SEA.15 In its original proposals of 17 September 1985, the 
Commission placed almost no limitations on Community environmental 
powers.16 By 11 November the British had managed to introduce provisions 
which required all Community environmental actions to take account of 
scientific and technical data, regional variations in the ability of the 
environment to absorb pollution, and the potential costs and benefits of 
legislation. By December the subsidiarity provision had been included as an 
additional limitation on EC power.17 All of these amendments gave written 
form to longstanding British criticisms of various EC environmental proposals. 
Intergovernmental bargaining exerted so much influence on the SEA's 
environmental provisions that Commission President Jacques Delors
15See J. Golub, 'British Sovereignty and the Development o f EC Environmental Policy,' 
paper presented at the ECPR Sessions, Bordeaux, 27 April-2 May 1995.
16See M. Gazzo, Towards European Union II (Brussels, Agence Europe, 1986), pp. 34-5.
17It is important to note that intergovernmental bargaining produced a final text with "a far 
different concept" of subsidiarity than the one found in the 1984 Spinelli draft. See L. 





























































































complained publicly how 'the text on the environment is simply window 
dressing...the Commission’s initial text was distorted. Now it is a piece that will 
no doubt be unanimously accepted and everyone will do what he thinks he 
should.'18
In practice, despite British expectations and Delors' trepidation, it appears 
that as a general rule, after the SEA the subsidiarity provision played little role 
in limiting the development of EC environmental policy prior to the Maastricht 
T reaty .19 The Government's successful deployment of the subsidiarity 
argument to prevent the 1986 proposal on chromium in water, and to stall 
adoption of the 1988 habitat proposal only highlights rare exceptions to the 
rule.20
One indication of this was that subsidiarity was totally absent as a topic 
of discussion within the Community and within academic discourse. For 
example, it appeared only once in the index of Agence Europe from 1988-1991, 
and not at all in the Social Sciences Index. There is also no evidence that 
subsidiarity was taken seriously within the Commission or Council as a brake 
on Community environmental policy. Legislative activity during the years 
subsequent to the SEA confirms that subsidiarity did nothing to retard the 
growth of EC environmental policy. As the following chart shows, the number 
of environmental proposals emanating from the Commission continued to grow 
rapidly after adoption of the SEA.21
18For Delors' comments and the various texts which preceded the SEA see Gazzo, 
Towards European Union II. pp. 87, 101. See also Kramer, EEC Treaty, pp. 65-68.
19Although never phrased in terms of subsidiarity, one might nevertheless argue that a 
commitment to retaining policy flexibility and national discretion-evidenced, for example, 
by a preference for directives rather than regulations-amounts to the same thing and has 
always been present in Community decisionmaking. See C. Ehlermann, 'How Flexible is 
Community Law? An Unusual Approach to the Concept o f "Two Speeds'", 82 Michigan 
Law Review 82 (1984) 1274- , G. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in 
the European Community and the United States', Columbia Law Review 94 (1994), p. 373.
20See House of Lords Select Committee on the EC, 2nd Report (1986-87), House of Lords 
Select Committee on the EC, 15th Report (1988-89), J. Golub, The Pivotal Role o f British 
Sovereignty in EC Environmental Policy,' EUI Working Paper RSC No. 94/17 (Florence, 
EUI, 1994).




























































































FIGURE 1 Number of EC Environmental Proposals 1986-1991
40
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Source: Compiled from the Official Journal o f  the European Communities, using the 
CEL EX database
This would appear to suggest that subsidiarity was either ignored entirely, or, 
instead of requiring unanimous consent, was applied in a manner dictated by a 
majority of states which interpreted the concept as a mandate for additional EC 
power.
Subsidiarity and Sovereignty After Maastricht
Although environmental protection is clearly an established Community 
goal, none of the various treaty provisions which refer to a high quality of life 
and high levels of environmental protection actually establish a mandate for a 
particular level of stringency or style of regulation. In other words, the treaty 
offers no inherent reason why EU action should always be preferred to national 
action. Rather, subsidiarity makes clear that national policy choice should be 
constrained only when EU action is clearly better and more efficient. This 
section attempts to specify more precisely the proper boundary between the two 
faces of subsidiarity, thereby staking out the theoretical limits of both national 
and EU power.
Article 3B of the Maastricht Treaty puts forward the heart of the 
subsidiarity principle, building on and generalising the provisions formerly 




























































































In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action...only if and in so far as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
Article A of the preamble provides a closely related aspect of subsidiarity, 
declaring that decisions should be taken 'as close as possible to the citizen.' The 
subsidiarity principle will apply to all new EU legislation, as well as to existing 
legislation which will be re-examined in light of the principle.22 Both the 
member states and the Commission have expressed their views on how 
subsidiarity should be operationalised, its implications for EU environmental 
policy and national sovereignty.23 According to the Commission, subsidiarity 
would require it to justify more fully all new proposals, resulting in fewer new 
EU laws. Subsidiarity would also lead to withdrawal or revision of many 
current proposals.24
The collective position of the member states is summed up in the Annex 
attached to the conclusions of the December 1992 European Council Summit 
held in Edinburgh.25 The Annex suggests several guidelines on how to fulfil 
the subsidiarity requirement:
22Some lawyers deny that any law adopted prior to the SEA can be re-examined under the 
subsidiarity principle. See A. Toth, 'Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?' European Law Review 19 
(1994) 268-285 and A. Toth, 'A Legal Analysis o f  Subsidiarity,' in O'Keefe, D. and P. 
Twomey, eds., Legal Issues o f the Maastricht Treaty (London. Chancery, 1994). However, 
this argument ignores a number o f crucial political considerations and is squarely 
contradicted by the views o f other lawyers, as well as by empirical evidence. See J. Steiner, 
'Subsidiarity Under the Maastricht Treaty', in O'Keefe and Twomey, eds., Legal Issues, pp. 
49-64.
23The 'Interinstitutional Agreement Between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on Procedures for Implementing the Subsidiarity Principle', by itself a brief and 
rather unilluminating document, is found in Agence Europe Documents #1857, 4 November 
1993, pp. 3-4.
24'European Commission Report to the European Council on the Adaptation of  
Community Legislation to the Subsidiarity Principle', COM(93)545, 24 November 1993, pp. 
3-5.





























































































• transnational aspects of a problem justify EU action
• preventing market distortion justifies EU action
• clear benefits from the scale or effect of policies justifies EU action
• Community measures must leave as much scope as possible for
national decision
• EU action should only cover states affected by a given difficulty, and
should not be extended to other unaffected states.
When examined more closely, each of these guidelines reveals the Janus-faced 
nature of subsidiarity and potentially carves out areas where additional national 
control over certain environmental issues is justified.
Recasting the Balance
Both the Commission and the Council agree that, under the subsidiarity 
principle, transboundary pollution justifies Community action. The question 
then becomes which areas of pollution contain a significant transboundary 
element and which do not. Community action related to the latter group would 
require a separate justification. As a matter of distributing political authority 
and justifying what are often enormously expensive regulations, it simply does 
not suffice to claim without any further analysis, as do some particularly 
zealous members of the EP, that 'most environmental problems have a 
transboundary character which require concerted EU action.'26
In fact, a wide range of policy areas involve little or no direct 
transboundary component. EU laws on noise, for example, have traditionally 
been aimed at removing trade barriers, and possibly improving general living 
conditions, not at preventing noise from vehicles or appliances spilling across 
national frontiers. There is nothing inherently transboundary about noisy 
products.
26See European Parliament Session Document A3-0380/92, 'Report o f the Committee on 
the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection on the Application of the Principle 




























































































Waste disposal offers a second significant example of a pollution issue 
which may fall under EU competence for its intimate connection to the 
functioning of the internal market, but which often lacks a significant 
transboundary dimension. EU laws regulating amounts of disposable waste, 
mandating high levels of recycling or prohibiting methods of domestic disposal 
constitute restrictions of essentially national practices which by themselves 
have no clear adverse environmental effects on neighbouring states. While the 
stringency of national waste disposal laws has an impact on transboundary 
waste shipments, which will gravitate to the point of lowest disposal costs, this 
does not create negative environmental externalities needed to justify EC 
intervention, as the environmental consequences of lax standards are bom 
entirely by the importing state. Quite simply, while many would question the 
wisdom of a decision by the UK, Spain or any other member state to act as the 
EU garbage can, such action does not subject neighbouring states to 
transboundary pollution.
EU laws on environmental impact assessment also fail to meet the 
transboundary pollution requirement. The environmental implications of 
building highways, refineries, large agricultural installations and suburban 
housing projects are local, or possibly regional, certainly not transnational, 
except in cases where projects are sited on a national border.
Preservation and destruction of habitats, flora and fauna offers one of the 
clearer cases of EU laws regulating what are basically national matters. 
Although many bird species migrate, bringing their protection under legitimate 
EU control as a transboundary matter, nearly half of the species now covered by 
the celebrated Birds Directive are non-migratory and therefore outside the 
bounds of EU power. Appeals for EU environmental competence based on the 
migratory nature of flora and fauna are clearly absurd. To get around the 
obviously national scope of establishing parks, protecting SSSIs and exploiting 




























































































transboundary pollution should be expanded to include 'psychic spill-overs', 
'preservation spill-overs' or 'heritage' alongside physical and economic 
externalities.27 If taken seriously, this would remove all limits on EU action— 
literally any policy which appealed to the emotional sentiments or sense of 
European (or human?) heritage of any actor could be imposed on a reluctant 
member state, a majority of whose citizens may have registered different 
psychic concerns through their choice of domestic laws.
Even certain aspects of air and water pollution are confined within 
national borders. Drinking water, for example, often originates from 
underground reservoirs rather than rivers. Pollution of these reservoirs may 
stem more from local agriculture and industrial activity than from any external 
source. In some cases pollution of beaches also results much more from 
domestic sewage and waste disposal, and from the effects of tourism than from 
the practices of foreign industry. And while some types of air pollution clearly 
have transboundary characteristics, others do not; industries located in the 
centre of large states or along the periphery of the Union might deposit the bulk 
of their emissions domestically or into the ocean.
The legitimate scope for EU environmental legislation takes on 
considerably different form once we recognise the limited extent of 
transboundary pollution. Combining this recognition with the European 
Council's admonishment at the Edinburgh summit to limit the number of states 
affected by EU law may generate new regulatory approaches, two of which will 
be mentioned here. First, it is worth considering how much justification there is 
to include periphery states within EU environmental regulations which affect 
production processes. For these states, more than any others, industrial
27See W. Wits, 'Subsidiarity and EC Environmental Policy: Taking People's Concerns 
Seriously,' Journal o f Environmental Law 6 (1994) 85-91, L. Brinkhorst, 'Subsidiarity and 
European Environmental Policy,' in Proceedings o f the Jacques Delors Colloquium, 
Subsidiarity: The Challenge o f Change (Maastricht, European Institute o f  Public 
Administration, 1991), R. Stewart, "Environmental Law in the United States and the 
European Community: Spillovers, Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions," University of Chicago 




























































































emissions, waste and sewage disposal, as well as agricultural practices have 
minimal transboundary effects. The British argument that environmental 
resiliency conferred by extensive tidal waters and favourable winds could be 
extended to other periphery states. Subsidiarity would therefore call for EU 
laws aimed at restricting practices only in the central states, leaving periphery 
states free to pursue their chosen policies.
An alternative but equally novel form of regulation which took account 
of the previous observations might involve a series of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements aimed at preventing regional transboundary pollution. This 
configuration has been referred to by Sir Richard Body as a 'Europe of many 
circles'.28 It is not entirely clear what role, if any, the EU would play in such a 
configuration. Multilateral agreements could take the form of traditional 
international treaties, but a more likely solution which avoids problems of free 
riding and incomplete contracting would be to make these agreements under the 
auspices of the EU, thereby vesting some measure of oversight with the 
Commission and enforcement power in the ECJ. A Europe of many circles 
shifts power away from Brussels but does not entirely restore national 
sovereignty over environmental policy.
To recognise a lack of transboundary effects in each of the above cases is 
not particularly surprising-EU regulations in these areas often originated not 
from purely environmental sentiments, but from a fear that unharmonised 
production processes and investment climate standards would result in market 
distortion. If these issues of process standards and assessment remain matters 
of market distortion then they will fall, according to Article 3B of the Treaty, 
within the Community's exclusive competence, an area untouched by the 
subsidiarity principle. If, on the other hand, their effect on competition turns 
out to be minimal, then they will fall under shared competence and thus under




























































































subsidiarity—EU action will not be justifiable purely on economic grounds but 
will require the existence of transboundary effects.
The important issue becomes how to distinguish between EU laws 
primarily concerned with environmental protection, and those whose main 
objective is completing the common market. There are strong reasons to 
believe that in many process standards the main objective, or 'centre of gravity', 
a term used by the ECJ in its handling of disputes over the proper legal basis of 
EC legislation, is actually environmental, making the entire subject a matter of 
subsidiarity.29
The argument turns on what constitutes a legitimate competitive 
advantage. Historically, lax product standards were considered sources of 
unfair competitive advantage, and states which allowed them were accused of 
creating pollution havens.30 States which introduced their own stringent 
domestic process standards undermined their competitive position, running the 
risk of having their industries relocate to more favourable conditions, and of 
losing inward foreign direct investment. In order to prevent a race to the 
bottom—the 'Delaware effect'—the Commission sought to harmonise process 
standards and thereby create more uniform investment climates.
29Actions brought against the Council by the Commission and European Parliament have 
forced the Court to adjudicate between Article 130S and Article 100A as the proper legal 
basis for various EC environmental laws. In its first ruling, the "titanium dioxide case", the 
Court annulled a Council decision to base a Directive on Article 130, holding that it should 
instead have been adopted under the qualified majority voting procedures established in 
Article 100A. In a more recent ruling—the "Belgian waste case"-the Court refused a request 
by the European Parliament to annul a Regulation, ruling that the Council had acted properly 
in basing the legislation on Article 130S. See Case C-300/89 decided on 11 June 1991, and 
Case C-187/93 decided on 28 June 1994.
30It has been argued elsewhere that states which allow lax standards, even if  they do attract 
investment or favour domestic industries, may in fact not be distorting the market but rather 
harnessing a legitimate competitive advantage. It is not clear that states with extensive 
coastlines or air flows which disperse pollution over the ocean should not treat these 
conditions as a natural competitive advantage, just as other states enjoy warm climates, 
sunshine and a position at the geographical heart o f Europe, all o f which favour certain crops 
and reduce various production costs such as energy and transportation. It is equally unclear 
how to reconcile the central Community objective of unrestrained economic competition with 
that of seeking a "level playing field". For a discussion of these issues, see Golub, British 
Integration. R. Stewart, 'Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness,' Yale 




























































































Recently, however, the Commission has expended considerable effort 
trying to convince people that stringent process standards do not harm 
competitiveness. Rather, they confer long-term competitive advantages on 
firms by encouraging them to use resources more efficiently, promoting their 
positive public image, forcing them to develop more flexible production 
methods and providing 'first mover' advantages by creating incentives for them 
to produce and sell technologically innovative remedies for environmental 
harms.31 For its part, the unquestionably green European Parliament agreed 
entirely with the proposition that stringent standards actually promote economic 
competitiveness.32 Nor, apparently, do higher standards jeopardise EU firms by 
adversely affecting international trade flows; available studies deny any 
connection between the two, mainly because the proportion of overall 
production costs devoted to environmental protection is negligible.33
The result of this new emphasis by the Commission and Parliament on 
green growth is to make their previous justification for EU action totally 
untenable—if the Commission is correct, then pollution havens are a misnomer 
because lax environmental standards actually entail economic competitive 
disadvantages. States which allow lax standards do not attract foreign 
investment, encourage industrial relocation or confer savings in production 
costs upon their own firms. Instead, these states are merely pursuing unwise 
policies which will undermine their own long-term industrial competitiveness. 
Their foolhardy decision to do this does not distort the market in their favour 
and thus does not justify harmonisation of process standards at EU level. Thus, 
under the subsidiarity principle, there might be no legitimate reason to set EU
31 See European Commission Communication on Industrial Competitiveness and 
Environmental Protection, SEC(92)1986.
32See European Parliament Document A 3-0112/94, Report o f the Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection on the need to assess the true costs to 
the Community of 'non-environment', 23 February 1994.
33See European Commission Communication on Economic Growth and the Environment, 
COM(94)465, reprinted in Europe Environment 6 December 1994, D. Vogel, 'The 
Relationship Between Environmental and Consumer Regulation and International Trade,' 




























































































standards for national production processes or impact assessment rules which 
dont cause transboundary pollution. Because, as mentioned above, many of 
these processes create no significant transboundary damage, it appears that 
under the subsidiarity principle large segments of existing and proposed EU 
environmental policy should be returned to or reserved for strictly national 
control.
To summarise the argument so far, there are two instances— 
transboundary pollution and market distortion—in which subsidiarity clearly 
serves to legitimate EU environmental action as 'better' than strictly national 
remedies. However, the frequency with which these conditions obtain is open 
to more question than many observers care to admit. This provides 
considerable scope for proponents of greater national sovereignty to invoke the 
subsidiarity principle against what they see as excessive EU intervention.
It remains then to consider if there are other situations, besides 
transboundary pollution and market distortion, which meet the subsidiarity 
principle requirement that action is 'better' taken at EU than national level. It 
has been suggested by some that EU environmental action is always better than 
state action because the latter offers no guarantee that any action will be taken,
and that all EU citizens should have the right to expect high environmental 
quality standards wherever they travel in the Union. The former argument is 
usually accompanied by the claim that whichever level of government will 
produce the highest environmental standards is by definition better and 
therefore appropriate. Upon closer inspection each of these arguments has the 
potential to degenerate into a fiercely anti-democratic tautology by ignoring the 




























































































Subsidiarity and Democratic Legitimacy
By bringing decisions closer to the citizen, it might be argued, 
subsidiarity is designed precisely to allow states and local communities to 
decide priorities for themselves, possibly ranking concern for growth, 
employment, lower taxes, or other areas of social expenditure above 
environmental legislation. The subsidiarity debate forces proponents of 
integration to address this question of democratic legitimacy when determining 
the proper allocation of authority for environmental policy. The democratic 
deficit, which has been widely recognised and commented upon, stems from the 
relative absence of participation, representation, accountability and legitimacy 
underpinning the Community policymaking process.34 In fact, the democratic 
deficit should come as no surprise, as the original design of the EC was 
intentionally undemocratic. The post-war fear of the potential consequences 
stemming from excessive democracy was reflected in the guiding philosophy of 
functional and neo-functional integration. Functionalism, particularly under the 
guidance of Jean Monnet, was based on elitism and technocracy, and 'not much 
concerned about the form of democratic control.'35
Subsidiarity forces a rethinking of this philosophy, and ushers in a much 
larger debate about the democratic legitimacy of the entire EC project than can 
be adequately explored in this brief paper. However, as a point of departure for 
this debate, one might start by considering the democratic legitimacy of EU 
environmental laws when subjected to a subsidiarity test. With its requirement 
that decisions be taken as close as possible to the people, subsidiarity could be 
read as a commitment to traditional democratic goals of self-determination and
34See B. Boyce, 'The Democratic Deficit o f the European Community', Parliamentary 
Affairs 46 (1993) 458-477, J. Lodge, 'Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy,' Journal of 
Common Market Studies 32 (1994) 343-368, J. Weiler et al., European Democracy and its 
Critique: Five Uneasy Pieces. EUI Working Paper RSC 95/11 (Florence, EUI, 1995), K. 
Featherstone, 'Jean Monnet and the "Democratic Deficit" in the European Union’, 32 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 32 (1994) 149-170.
35J. Pinder, 'European Community and Nation-State: A Case for a Neo-federalism’, 
International Affairs 62 (1986), p. 51. See also K. Featherstone, 'Jean Monnet’ and E. Haas, 




























































































accountability.36 This would create a presumption for less EC control, and 
greater reliance on decisions which were 'better' taken on the national level 
precisely because they were more democratic. Even substantial moves towards 
greater transparency and empowerment of the European Parliament will not 
bestow upon Community actions as much democratic accountability as is 
currently enjoyed by policies adopted within individual member states, each of 
which boasts the central features of liberal representative democracy: universal 
suffrage, regular elections, free expression.37
Nevertheless, returning to the pro-integration face of subsidiarity, it is 
possible to identify at least two situations where a strong case can be made to 
rebut this presumption and establish the superiority of EC laws. First, if 
advocates of EC environmental policy were to invoke subsidiarity as a 
justification for EC law despite its dubious democratic legitimacy. This could 
be done by explicitly weighing the value of democracy against that of some 
other value, such as upholding individual rights or adhering to a general theory 
of justice. Under this application of subsidiarity, EC laws which guaranteed 
minimum environmental standards as a matter of human rights or European 
citizenship would gain legitimacy as clearly superior to democratically secure 
but nevertheless inadequate national legislation. Similarly, European standards 
could be termed 'better' than national action if they more adequately guaranteed 
sustainable development, a goal derived from theories of intergenerational 
ju stice .38 Instead of balancing democratic goals against other values, 
proponents of EC integration could follow a second path and develop an 
explicit theory of democracy by which to legitimate EC environmental policy,
36Bermann, 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously', p. 340.
37See R. Dahl, Dilemmas o f Pluralist Democracy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1982), particularly p. 15, D. Held, Prospects for Democracy. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1993), Lodge, Transparency'.
38E. W eiss, "Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment," 
American Journal o f International Law 84 (1990) 190. For a detailed analysis which rejects 
the ethical foundations of the intergenerational justice argument but which nevertheless 





























































































thereby allowing them to argue that decisions were actually democratically 
better if taken at the EC level.
A major impediment to resolving the tension between democracy, 
subsidiarity and integration is that nearly all democratic theory has been 
developed in the statal context, leaving little room for the democratic legitimacy 
of supranational decisionmaking.39 In his recent work, Weiler has made 
preliminary efforts to develop a model of democracy applicable to international 
governance such as that found in the EU.40 Weiler lays the groundwork for a 
defence of EU laws as products of consociational or neo-corporatist democracy. 
Although this line of analysis has yet to be developed in detail, such models of 
democracy which concentrate on pluralism might prove particularly fruitful in 
the case of environmental policy, where EU institutions and legislation, 
compared with traditional national structures, often guarantee greater access by 
diverse and under-represented societal groups such as environmentalists, 
particularly at the agenda-setting stage of policy development.
By far the most developed theoretical treatment of this matter is found in 
the recent work of David Held, who provides a valuable starting point for 
extending democratic theory to the EC level and using it to distribute authority 
over environmental policy. Held has developed what he calls a 'cosmopolitan' 
model of democracy which might serve to demarcate EC policy from national 
p o licy .41 At the core of this model lies the contention that global 
interconnectedness complicates traditional notions of autonomy, consent and 
accountability. In many situations, policies taken in any one state create or 
exacerbate what Held calls 'power disjunctures', impacting directly on the 
ability of other states to guarantee the rights of their citizens to welfare, 
economic prosperity and environmental quality. In short, global 
interconnectedness introduces asymmetries between individual policies, the
39Weiler et al., 'Democracy', p. 30.
40Weiler et al., 'Democracy', pp. 25-37.




























































































population which consents to their effects, and the inclusivity of the voting 
population (the demos) which legitimates their introduction. Only through 
international law and a drastic reconsideration of what we mean by constituency 
are these asymmetries adequately addressed.
In cases of transboundary pollution the model clearly undermines the 
democratic legitimacy of individual national policies, and lends considerable 
support to EC, if not global regulation. Similarly, in situations where national 
environmental standards impede neighbouring states' pursuit of economic 
prosperity by encouraging investment and job migration to pollution havens, 
cosmopolitan democracy would suggest that action as close as possible to the 
citizen should give way to Community standards.42
Nevertheless, it does not follow that in all cases the subsidiarity principle 
justifies EC environmental action as a democratically better alternative to 
strictly national policy, and even here the two-faced nature of subsidiarity 
reasserts itself. Held's model allows ample room to argue that in the name of 
democratic legitimacy the subsidiarity principle requires a transfer of control 
over environmental protection from EC to national level. Power disjunctures 
requiring international rectification only occur in cases where environmental 
issues are transboundary in nature. In other cases, it appears that Held would 
support national environmental laws which fostered all of the traditional values 
bound up in liberal representative democracy, and implicit in the subsidiarity 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. If, as noted previously, many types of 
environmental regulation do not actually involve transboundary issues, 
pollution havens really do not exist, and competitive advantages do not flow to 
states with low environmental standards, then proponents of EC regulation are 
faced with the unenviable task of defending Community laws which lack 
democratic legitimacy even under a contemporary model which frequently
42Dahl also notes the need to consider the effects o f  decisions made by any autonomous 
organisation on the "rights, freedom or welfare" of non-members and the possibility that 




























































































identifies the international level as 'the appropriate locus for the articulation of 
the democratic political good.'43
In summing up the continuing importance of democracy in the modem 
interconnected world, Held himself provides a concise justification for applying 
the subsidiarity principle in a manner which increases national sovereignty over 
environmental policy: 'The issues which rightly belong to national levels of 
governance are those in which people in delimited territories are significantly 
affected by collective problems and policy questions which stretch to, but no 
further than, their frontiers.'44
Empirical Evidence
The subsidiarity principle has already made an impact on the distribution 
of power over environmental policy between the EU and the member states. As 
mentioned above, we would expect that when operationalised, the subsidiarity 
principle could potentially produce fewer EU environmental proposals, a 
removal of some previous as well as pending proposals, and a general shift in 
EU environmental proposals towards greater national discretion.
Reduction and Withdrawal of EU Proposals
The Commission itself admitted that the subsidiarity principle had 
'already led to a reduction in the number of proposals put forward by the 
Commission in 1993 compared with previous years.'45 This reduction only 
accelerated in the following two years—the total number of Commission 
proposals from 1993-onwards was as follows:46
43Held, 'Democracy', p. 225.
44Held, 'Democracy', p. 235; Dahl reaches a similar conclusion about the democratic 
legitimacy of decisions which produce limited effects. See D ah l, 'Dilemmas’, p. 196.
45European Commission Report, p. 4.
46Although there was a levelling off o f  Commission proposals as early as 1989, followed 
by a slight decline through 1991, all o f which reveals the influence of factors other than 
subsidiarity, it is unclear whether the downward trend would have continued, certainly at 




























































































FIGURE 2 Number of Commission Proposals 1992-1995
1992 1993 1994 1995
656 628 533 375
Source: Compiled from  the official Journal o f the European 
Communities, using the CELEX database
The reduction of Commission initiatives is particularly striking in the area of 
EC environmental proposals. Compared with the steady growth of 
environmental proposals after the SEA, as shown in the earlier graph, it appears 
that the subsidiarity principle has significantly stemmed Commission legislative 
activity in this area, as revealed in the following graph.47
FIGURE 3 Number of EC Environmental Proposals 1992-1995
1992 1993 1994 1995
Source: Compiled from the Official Journal o f the European Communities, 
using the CELEX database
Besides reducing its total legislative output, the Commission has also 
withdrawn or modified a number of environmental proposals. To date it 
appears that Britain has had the greatest success in preventing Community 
environmental action, despite fierce resistance from the European Parliament. 
Britain deployed the subsidiarity argument to secure the removal of several 
proposals on its 1993 'hit-list', and played an instrumental role in blocking the 
carbon tax on similar grounds.48
had slightly exceeded that o f 1991, signalling the possibility o f renewed Commission 
activity.
47Figures include directives, regulations and decisions. Current data for 1995 may indicate 
a slightly higher figure, due to Commission administrative backlog when entering recent data 
into the CELEX database.





























































































The intensity/proportionality component of subsidiarity holds that when 
the EU does take action, it should do so only to the extent necessary. This 
implies that the EU should adopt instruments which maintain as much 
discretion as possible at the national level, thereby minimising incursions on 
national sovereignty and national choice of policy styles. Regulations and other 
detailed or binding measures should be avoided, whereas framework directives, 
soft law and voluntary codes should be encouraged.
In practice it appears that this aspect of subsidiarity has already made an 
impression on the development of EU environmental policy. A considerable 
degree of discretion and flexibility has been built into Community 
environmental policies on packaging waste, eco-audits and voluntary action by 
industry to control pollution.49 Greater national discretion is also clearly 
evident in the Commission's recent moves towards replacing a range of existing 
legislation with framework directives for air and water pollution. Under these 
frameworks, states will enjoy greater control over standard setting.50 In each of 
these cases, decisionmaking under the terms of subsidiarity has consolidated 
rather than eroded national control over environmental policy.
Conclusion
The primary aim of this paper was to explore how the Janus-faced 
concept of subsidiarity could be used either to legitimate EU environmental 
policy or to undermine supranational decisionmaking. Taken in the abstract, 
subsidiarity justifies EU environmental intervention whenever this is deemed 
'better' than strictly national action. But without clear criteria to guide its 
application, the term 'better', and with it the entire subsidiarity principle, merely
49See 'European Commission Report’ and Agence Europe 17 December 1993.




























































































degenerates into a rhetorical football. An attempt was thus made to identify the 
conditions under which each of these two faces should prevail.
There is broad agreement that EC intervention is inherently better than 
individual national measures when dealing with transboundary pollution or 
environmental standards which distort economic competition and affect the 
functioning of the common market. Many types of pollution fall into this 
category, as do product standards. In all of these cases, subsidiarity provides a 
powerful justification for continued or expanded EU control over national 
environmental affairs.
However, a number of considerations, particularly the Commission's 
recent emphasis of green competitiveness, call into question the actual extent of 
transboundary pollution and market distortion. If unable to meet these two 
central criteria, the subsidiarity principle would demand that control over 
process standards, impact assessment and a range of other environmental issues 
be returned to national governments, especially for states on the periphery of 
the Union. Furthermore, even when these criteria are met, subsidiarity implies 
that EU environmental laws should bind only those states where a specific 
problem occurs, and that in doing so it should leave as much scope as possible 
for national discretion over the choice of policy instmments.
Although member states may unanimously decide that the EU should 
enjoy authority over environmental matters which pose no transboundary or 
market distorting harms, it remains essential to consider whether the 
subsidiarity principle may also legitimate a decision to move beyond these 
categories despite national opposition. It is hard to escape the conclusion that 
because of their greater democratic legitimacy, a value inexorably linked with 
the subsidiarity principle, national environmental laws are inherently better than 
EU intervention. To overcome the force of this argument, proponents of 
supranational action must identify aspects of EU environmental regulation 




























































































action should not be taken as close as possible to the citizen, as required by the 
treaty. Alternatively, proponents of integration could capitalise on the Janus­
faced nature of subsidiarity and support EU environmental policy as actually 
more democratically legitimate than national laws, when viewed through a 
contemporary model of democracy suited to a world of highly interconnected 
states.
As far as which of the subsidiarity principle's two faces has prevailed in 
political discourse, available evidence suggests that subsidiarity has already 
returned a significant amount of sovereignty to the states by curtailing the 
number of new EU proposals, removing certain proposals from the agenda, and 
amending others to allow greater national leeway. Britain has been particularly 
successful in this regard, securing removal and amendment of proposals which 
the Government has long opposed. The Government's recent success contrasts 
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